SELECTED DOCKET AND LEGISLATIVE
SUMMARIES, 2013
The FCC’s Proposed (and Recently Adopted) Rule Loosening Foreign
Ownership Restrictions on Broadcast Entities
On October 24, 2013, FCC Acting Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn circulated
a declaratory ruling that would reassess the FCC’s rule that caps foreign ownership of U.S. television stations to 25%, with a reemphasis on a case-by-case
method of review. On November 14, 2013, the Commissioners unanimously
agreed to approve and adopt the Declaratory Ruling (FCC 13-150).
The Declaratory Ruling does not alter a preexisting rule; rather, it reinterprets
the original language of the rule to satisfy what it was intended to do: limit foreign-ownership of domestic broadcasting while providing opportunity for foreign ownership on a case-by-case basis that would serve the public interest. This
summary assesses how a rule affecting foreign ownership of domestic broadcasting entities, codified at Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of
1934, has evolved over time, and how this new interpretation will affect domestic broadcasting entities and their prospective foreign investors.
I.

HISTORY OF SECTION 310(B)(4)

Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934 prohibits foreign ownership in excess of 25% of U.S. entities that control broadcast licensees when
the Commission determines that the limitation is in the public interest. At the
time the rule was adopted, foreign-ownership of domestic broadcast entities was
perceived as a potential threat to national security, affecting the United States’
ship-to-shore communications and other paramilitary uses. The FCC’s foreign
ownership restrictions, including 310(b)(4), were intended to secure homeland
broadcasts from threats such as foreign coercion and propaganda during wartime.
The language of the rule clearly provides that foreign-ownership in excess of
25% would be permitted on a case-by-case basis. Initially, the benchmark served
as a “soft cap” restriction, requiring broadcast entities to seek FCC approval
should they exceed the 25% limit. Over the next 80 years, the rule was interpreted as having a “hard cap,” and the FCC preferred to treat the 25% ownership
as an absolute limit, rather than spend time determining whether foreign ownership would be a threat to the public interest. The FCC believed that substantial
foreign ownership of domestic broadcast stations and other types of radio spectrum licensees naturally did not serve the public interest. In fact, the FCC has
225

226

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 22

issued only one waiver of the 25% cap in the past, when it granted a retroactive
waiver to Rupert Murdoch in the 1990s.
II.

REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 310(B)(4)

For the past 80 years, the decline in potential military threats to U.S. broadcasting, coupled with a globalizing economy, have stimulated new opportunities
for the communications market. Over 15 years ago, the FCC adjusted its policies
and procedures authorizing foreign investment exceeding a statutory benchmark
for common carrier licensees to reflect the changes of globalization and a growing market, while remaining inflexible with the broadcast benchmark. It is only
natural that other communication venues, such as broadcast stations, should be
granted opportunities to international capital.
Broadcasters, special interest groups, and other proponents of a reinterpretation asserted that the previous application of 310(b)(4) restricted the flow of foreign capital to domestic broadcast licensees. The National Association of Media
Brokers (“NAMB”) indicated that banks from Canada and Europe, which are
interested in equity investments in U.S. broadcast stations, have limited participation because of the 25% rule. Another supporter of the Declaratory Ruling,
the Coalition for Broadcast Investment, comprised of companies such as CBS
Corp., Walt Disney Co., and Univision, led the charge in instigating the change
to capitalize on foreign investments. Other supporters believe that the ruling will
benefit station diversity, leveling the playing field for minorities, women, and
small broadcast entities that historically have an issue finding access to capital.
III.

EFFECTS OF THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
310(B)(4)

The new interpretation clarifies that the FCC will, in presumably most or all
cases, review petitions for foreign ownership that exceed 25% on a case-by-case
basis. Although the rule is being relaxed, this does not mean that all companies
seeking foreign investment should anticipate a sudden influx of capital. The
Commission will still take issues such as national security, foreign policy, and
trade policy into consideration when reviewing broadcast foreign investment
proposals, and will still discuss the issues with other Executive Branch agencies.
Further, broadcast-controlling entities still may not exceed the 25% threshold
without FCC approval, and to satisfy the public interest filing required by Section 310(b)(4), they must still provide detailed information to the Commission.
This decision paves the way for foreign companies like Qatar-based AlJazeera to consider expanding their presence in the U.S. Broadcasting market,
and conglomerates like Univision may spread their influence through anticipated
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Initial Public Offerings in foreign markets. In summation, this Declaratory Ruling simply relaxes the Commission’s interpretation of a rule, which will likely
enable foreign companies to invest more capital in U.S. broadcasting entities.
Hopefully, this will accomplish the FCC’s goal of providing new opportunities
to capital for broadcasting entities, while still providing ample room for the FCC
to step in and prevent foreign ownership when it harms the public interest.
Summarized by Andrew C. Burr

S. 1680, The Consumer Choice in Online Video Act
In November 2013, Senator Jay Rockefeller introduced S. 1680, The Consumer Choice in Online Video Act. Senator Rockefeller sees the growth of
online video as an opportunity to promote competition and innovation in the
media marketplace that would result in a benefit to consumers. The Act aims to
reduce anticompetitive practices by Multichannel Video Playback Distributors
(MVPDs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that can inhibit the growth of
online video providers. The Act also seeks to help consumers make more informed decisions when purchasing an Internet service. Finally, the Act legitimizes antenna rental services like the heavily litigated Aerio. Senator Rockefeller hopes this could eventually lead to an “a la carte” video marketplace.1
Title I of S. 1680 seeks to improve consumers’ ability to make an informed
decision when choosing an Internet service provider. It instructs the Commission
to promulgate regulations within a year of the Act’s passage that would require
ISPs to disclose the length of the contract, terms of renewal, and a projected
monthly bill. These include post-initial promotions, procedures to cancel the service, actual transmission speeds, and details on their network management, as
well any additional features the Commission finds necessary. The legislation includes further direction for usage based billing. It would require a plain language
statement of the terms and conditions and an explanation of how usage would
be calculated, including how it would affect a consumer’s use of the service. For
example, it would indicate how much high definition video a consumer could
watch during a billing period without incurring overuse fees. It then requires
ISPs to disclose the requisite overuse fees, while also showing consumers their
monthly data usage and notifying them of how much data remains to be used.
Finally, the legislation directs the Commission to develop standards on how to
1
Featured Legislation: The Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Nov. 12, 2013, http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Legislation&ContentRecord_id=060460a1-5ef6-4c7b-8d52c65ee5266d87.
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track consumers’ data usage.
Title II attempts to put online video distributors on the same level as traditional MVPDs by attacking what S. 1680 calls “unfair competition.” The Act
states it would “increase competition, innovation, and diversity in the video programming marketplace.” If enacted, the legislation would make it unlawful for
MVPDs to contract with content providers in a way that would create disincentives for them to sell their content to online video distributors as well. This also
includes understandings and arrangements not to sell to online video providers
or limit what platform the online video provider can play the content on. It also
targets exclusive contracts between content providers and either MVPDs and
online video providers. The legislation also makes it unlawful for broadcasters
or television networks to refuse to negotiate with online video providers. Further, a video program vendor cannot block consumers from its content during
disputes with the consumers’ MVPD if they previously made the content available online.
The most significant part of the legislation deals with the effect the Act would
have on the broadcast industry and its relationship with IP-based antenna services. The legislation would give statutory legitimacy to services such as the
increasingly popular and legally controversial Aerio antenna service. It states
that antenna services can rent antennas to consumers that can be viewed directly
over the internet or to an individual data storage system so it can be viewed as a
recording through an internet connection. Unlike traditional MVPDs, the bill
would exempt these antenna services from paying retransmission fees to broadcasters under Section 325 of the Communications Act. However, the legislation
limits access only to broadcast signals that are in the consumer’s market.
The legislation also touches on net neutrality issues. It makes it unlawful for
an ISP to inhibit anyway an online video provider’s ability to deliver content to
a consumer. This includes blocking or degrading content, discriminating against
content, providing benefits to a video content company that is affiliated with the
ISP, or using a billing system that deters competition with the ISP or its affiliate
services.
Title III of the legislation allows for online video providers who perform similarly to traditional MVPDs to elect as a non-facilities based MVPD. The legislation ask the Commission to consider what rules applicable to traditional
MVPDs should also apply to non-facilities based MVPDs, including technical
standards and broadcast time requirements. Once they elect as a non-facilities
based MVPD, the legislation would prohibit practices by MVPDs that block
content from non-facilities based MVPDs, acting similarly to the program access
rules. It would also make it unlawful for MVPDs to retaliate against program
vendors who make their content available on non-facilities based MVPDs.
Also, any commercial broadcast station within a relevant DMA would have a
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duty to negotiate in good faith with the non-facilities based MVPD for carriage
of the signal. However, in what would be a major development, a non-facilities
based MVPD would also be able to bring in a single non-local broadcast signal
while not being required to have any local stations at all. These signals could be
accessed on any platform used by the non-facilities based MVPD. The bill also
states that if a non-facilities based MVPD seeks to add a noncommercial broadcast station, then other noncommercial broadcast stations can seek carriage on
the system. These non-facilities based MVPDs would be excluded from franchise requirements and would not be counted towards “effective competition”
analyses.
The future of S. 1680 is in doubt. Rep. Bob Latta (R-Ohio), Vice Chairman
of the Communications House Subcommittee, said there are no plans to hear
testimony about the bill in the subcommittee.2 Industry reactions of the bill are
mixed. Public Knowledge Senior Staff Attorney John Bergmayer hailed the bill
as a way of leveling the playing field for online providers and making them more
competitive with incumbent MVPDs.3 However, some are cautious. The National Association of Broadcasters, undoubtedly troubled by the bill’s favoritism
for rival antenna services like Aerio, stated that they were looking forward to
working on the bill, but also asserted that NAB is “concerned about proposals
that may legitimize theft of copyrighted programming. Copyright theft poses a
very real threat to the revenue stream that supports local television and the U.S.
network-affiliate TV relationship that is the envy of the world.”4 Further, Time
Warner Cable chairman Glenn Britt questions how S.1680 attacks exclusive
contracts and argues that they are an integral part of business in the entertainment industry.5
Summarized by William Durdach

2
Brendan Sasso, Republican: House Won’t Take Up Online Video Bill, The Hill, Nov.
20, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/190881-republican-house-wont-take-uponline-video-bill.
3
Jon Brodkin, Bill Would Make It Illegal for ISPs to Slow Down Online Video Services,
Ars Technica, Nov. 13, 2013, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/bill-would-makeit-illegal-for-isps-to-slow-down-online-video-services/.
4
Press Release, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement on Introduction
of Video Programming Legislation by Sen. Rockefeller, Nov. 12, 2013, available at
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pressRelease.asp?id=3256.
5
Brian Santo, Proposed Bill Will Turn Video Business Upside Down, CED Magazine,
Nov. 13, 2013, http://www.cedmagazine.com/news/2013/11/proposed-bill-will-turn-videobusiness-upside-down.
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In re Implementing Public Safety Broadband Provisions of the Middle
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012; Implementing a Nationwide,
Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band;
Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands (Oct. 28,
2013).
On October 28, 2013, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or
“Commission”) adopted its Second Report and Order (“Order”) adopting consolidated technical rules for the 758-769/788-799 MHz band, which is licensed
to the First Responder Network Authority (“FirstNet”). The Order’s purpose is
to expedite the availability of equipment for FirstNet as prescribed by the Middle
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (the “Act”).
I.

BACKGROUND

The Act provided for deployment of a nationwide public safety network in
the 700 MHz band, and established FirstNet as its administrator within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The Act
also established a Technical Advisory Board for First Responder Interoperability
(“Interoperability Board”), which recommended a network based on commercial
standards for Long Term Evolution (LTE). The Commission approved these recommendations on June 21, 2012 for transmittal to FirstNet, which was required
to incorporate them into its requests for proposals.
On September 7, 2012, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
adopted a Report and Order deleting inconsistent Commission rules and directing the Commission to reallocate Block D spectrum for “public safety services.”
This action deleted rules that governed operations of FirstNet under previous
“Public Safety Broadband License.”
As a result, the Commission released a Notice on March 8, 2013, seeking
comments regarding the adoption of consolidated technical service rules, the exercise of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities overseeing FirstNet, and
transition matters for incumbent operation in spectrum licensed to FirstNet.
II.

CONSOLIDATING TECHNICAL RULES THAT GOVERN
FIRSTNET:

The Order includes nine categories of rule consolidations: (1) Power Limits,
(2) Emission Limits, (3) Field Strength Limits, (4) Interference Coordination,
(5) International Considerations, (6) 700 MHz Public Safety Guard Band, (7)
Equipment Certification, (8) Miscellaneous Proposals From the Comment Record, and (9) Further Rule Consolidations.
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A. Power Limits
The Commission proposed modifying § 90.542(a) of its rules to bring D
Block frequencies under its purview while deleting the redundant provisions of
§ 27.50(b). At the same time, the Commission sought comment on whether §
90.542(a) power limits remain appropriate for the combined public safety broadband allocation, and whether operation parameters for LTE will require more
restrictive limits on portable device power output.
Most commenters supported the general approach of § 90.542(a) and its application to the D block. Verizon and Harris had opposing views regarding reduced base station power limits for antennas greater than 305 meters Height
Above Average Terrain (HAAT), with Verizon favoring stricter power limits
consistent with adjacent bands. Regarding issues of power limits on portable
devices, Motorola Solutions noted that § 90.542(a) expresses power limits in
terms of “effective radiated power” (ERP) to account for antenna gains and
losses, which is different than the LTE standard. General Dynamics stated that
further restrictions on hand-held device power outputs may negate important advances in research and development by device manufacturers.
As a result of these comments, the Commission maintains power and antenna
height limits of § 90.542(a) and extends them to the D Block. The Commission
also maintains the 3 watt ERP for hand-held devices.
The Commission also proposed consolidation of power flux density limits for
FirstNet spectrum under § 90.542(a). Among commenters, Motorola Solutions
argued that a 3000 μW/m2 limit is an effective compromise, while Harris argued
that limiting power flux density only of signals transmitted in excess of 1000
watts ERB is counterproductive to minimizing interference. The Commission
agreed with Motorola Solutions and consolidated existing power flux density
limits under § 90.542(a), but not without observing that it expects FirstNet to
carefully coordinate site deployments with adjacent narrowband licensees.
B. Emission Limits
The Commission proposed unifying under § 90.543 out-of-band emission
(OOBE) limits on FirstNet spectrum. This would be accomplished by first consolidating into § 90.543(e) emissions restrictions from FirstNet allocations into
adjacent 700 MHz public safety narrowband segments. Second, consolidation
would include § 90.543(f) limits on emissions from FirstNet devices into the
1559-1610 MHz Global Positioning System (GPS) bands. And third, the Commission sought comment on whether the limits of § 27.53(d)(3) on D Block
emissions should be extended to apply to FirstNet spectrum.
For emissions into adjacent narrowband spectrum, AT&T supported the proposed rule consolidation, while Harris believed that more protection was needed.
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Regarding the 1559-1610 MHz GPS band, commenters generally agreed to consolidate as proposed, but with differing views on whether this should include
harmonics language in the final rule. For limits on FirstNet emissions, both
AT&T and General Dynamics supported the Commission’s proposal.
After consideration, the Commission modified § 90.543(e) to encompass the
D Block portion of FirstNet’s spectrum. The Commission also extended §
90.543(f) protections of GPS operations to emissions from D Block devices, retaining the harmonics language. Finally, the Commission adopted § 27.53(d)(3)
limits on FirstNet emissions into adjacent commercial spectrum.
C. Field Strength Limits
The Commission previously sought comment on whether a field strength limit
should be established for the expanded public safety broadband allocation.
These limits would reduce interference between the FirstNet radio access network (RAN) and any State Networks deployed on the same band. The Commission also proposed adopting the § 27.55(a)(2) field strength limit of 400
dBuV/M.
Commenters were split, with some arguing that the potential for multiple network deployments supported the Commission’s limits. Others argued that State
Networks should function within the single, FirstNet RAN, and that limits
should be unnecessary given expectations of siting cooperation.
The Commission elected not to adopt any field strength limits for RANs operating within FirstNet’s licensed spectrum, citing the requirements that State
Networks must coordinate with FirstNet before deployment of their own networks.
D. Interference Coordination
In the Notice, the Commission also discussed considered FirstNet or other
broadband operators in its licensed spectrum should be required to undertake
any forms of interference coordination with 700 MHz commercial licensees or
public safety narrowband users.
Among commenters, APCO, Motorola Solutions, and AT&T advised against
imposing potentially burdensome coordination requirements, noting that stakeholders have significant motivation to act voluntarily to minimize interference.
The Commonwealth of Virginia argued for the imposition of coordination requirements, noting that its network had already experienced harmful interference.
The Commission found that it was not necessary to adopt formal coordination
requirements, but noted that licensing and spectrum management tools remain
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available to minimize interference.
E. International Considerations
The Commission agreed to remove international coordination provisions for
D Block from § 27.57(b) of the rules and move them to § 90.533, which already
contains substantively identical provisions.
F. 700 MHz Public Safety Guard Band
The Commission recognized in the Notice that the FirstNet license includes
768-769/798-799 MHz bands which have been designated as guard bands by the
Commission to protect nearby broadband and narrowband segments of the 700
MHz public safety band. The Commission proposed that these designations remain, and sought comment.
Some commenters agreed with the Commission’s proposed plan, at least during early stages of broadband deployment. Others suggested that the guard band
spectrum could see limited use for localized, low power applications. In addition, a third group argued that FirstNet should retain control over all spectrum
licensed to it, including the guard bands.
The Commission elected to retain its regulations requiring the 768-769/798799 MHz guard bands, but allowed that later stage network developments might
see a relaxation of these rules.
G. Equipment Certification
In the Notice, the Commission proposed consolidating equipment certification rules for FirstNet devices under § 90.549. This was done with knowledge
that these certifications would be subject to as yet unadopted technical rules. The
Commission also sought comment on whether it should adopt certification requirements specific to this band that would augment those already present in §
90.549. The Commission also proposed removing the legacy provisions of §
90.203(p).
Commenters supported consolidating equipment certification rules, though
many including FirstNet itself and Motorola Solutions noted that the suspension
of certifications was problematic for early deployment. Others including APCO
and Harris urged adoption of an expedited process for approval of equipment
prior to adoption of technical service rules. For the augmented certification requirements, Motorola Solutions and FirstNet both argued that they would add
unnecessary delay.
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With this Order, the Commission adopted technical service rules for equipment certifications to begin. The Commission also decided to unify equipment
certification under § 90.549 without further augmentation, and to delete §
90.203(p).
H. Miscellaneous Proposals from the Comment Board
In addition to existing technical rules, AT&T proposed that the Commission
adopt rules ensuring that the public safety broadband network operates in accordance with “commercial standards” defined by statute. This was opposed by
Motorola Solutions, which argued that such language could hinder development
of technologies that do not precisely follow commercial standards. The Commission declined AT&T’s proposal, noting that the topic of “commercial standards” was beyond the scope of the original Notice.
Commenter Harris proposed that the Commission establish distinct rules for
different base stations consistent with 3GPP definitions and technical specifications, especially concerning transmitting power and minimum coupling loss restrictions. The Commission declined this proposal, noting that the technical rules
already include well defined interference protections.
I.

Further Rule Consolidations

The Commission also consolidated other minor rules, ensuring that operations
of D Block are entirely governed by Part 90 of the rules, with no provisions
remaining in Part 27.
III.

CONCLUSION

In addition to issuing these consolidated technical rules, the Commission
found that there is sufficient “good cause” to implement the Order immediately
rather than wait the thirty days required by § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Reasons included the earlier suspension of equipment certification,
impending deployments, the presence of signed contracts, and public safety benefits of FirstNet. The Order was therefore effective on October 28, 2013.
Summarized by Nick Kokkinos
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Do Not Track Online Act of 2013, S. 418, 113th Congress
On February 28, 2013, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Senator Richard Blumenthal (DCT) introduced S. 418, the Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2013 (“Act”). The Act
would direct the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to establish rules for a national online privacy regime enabling individuals to opt out of personal data collection efforts conducted by their internet, mobile, and online service providers.
Once an individual elects to opt out of collection of their personal information,
any provider who does so would be in violation of the Act. Remedies, enforceable by the FTC and the states, include injunctive relief, damages, restitution,
and civil penalties.
I.

REGULATIONS RELATING TO “DO-NOT-TRACK”
MECHANISMS

Section 2 would direct the FTC to promulgate regulations establishing the
standards for an online mechanism allowing consumers to opt out of data collection within one year after the Act’s enactment. In an effort to address growing
concerns about online privacy, the mechanism should give an “individual [a]
simpl[e] and eas[y way to] indicate whether the individual prefers to have personal information collected by providers of online services, including by providers of mobile applications and services.” The Act directs the FTC to use its rulemaking authority to promulgate specific rules prohibiting providers from “collecting personal information on individuals who have expressed . . . a preference
not to have such information collected.”
The Act contains two exceptions: the first permits collecting personal information “necessary to provide a service requested by the individual, including
with respect to such service, basic functionality and effectiveness, so long as
such information is anonymized or deleted upon the provision of such service,”
and; the second permits individuals to affirmatively consent to the collection of
their personal information after having received “clear, conspicuous, and accurate notice on the collection and use of such information.”
In promulgating the standards and rules, the FTC would be directed to take
several factors into consideration that include: the appropriate scope of the
standards and rules; the conduct that will be covered and the individuals who
will be required to comply; the technical feasibility and costs of implementation
and compliance; any mechanisms which are already developed and in use; how
to publicize and offer the mechanisms to individuals; whether information can
be collected anonymously so it cannot be reasonably linked or identified with a
person or device, on its own or in combination with other information; and
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whether information can be collected and used subject to the anonymization and
deletion requirements.
II.

ENFORCEMENT OF “DO-NOT-TRACK” MECHANISMS

Section 3 would authorize the FTC to enforce violations of the Act under existing statutes pertaining to unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce. All privileges and immunities available under the FTC Act would be available under the Act. Nonprofit organizations are treated as an individual subject to the Act.
Section 3 would authorize enforcement by states’ Attorneys General as
parens patriae on behalf of aggrieved citizens through civil action in district
court. Remedies available would be enjoinment of further violations, compulsive compliance, damages, restitution, and other compensation, with civil penalties up to $16,000 per day an individual is in violation, for a maximum of
$15,000,000.
Generally, a state’s Attorney General must notify the FTC prior to initiating
suit. If pre-filing notice is not feasible, notice still must occur immediately upon
filing of a complaint. The FTC can intervene in any civil action brought under
the Act by an Attorney General, be heard on all issues raised, and appeal final
decisions. Venue lies in the appropriate district court, and service can be made
upon any inhabitant of the State or any individual personally in the State.
Section 3 would permit “[a]ny other officer of a State who is authorized by
the State to . . . bring a civil action . . . subject to the same requirements and
limitations that apply . . . to civil actions.” The Act would not “prohibit an authorized official of a State from initiating or continuing any proceeding in a court
of the State for a violation of any civil or criminal law of the State.”
III.

BIENNIAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

Finally, the Act would require the FTC, no later than two years after the effective date, to conduct a review of the regulations’ implementation, effectiveness (including how the term “personal information” is defined or interpreted),
effect on online commerce, and to submit these findings in a report to Congress.
Summarized by Janette M. Richardson

